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ABSTRACT
The Lightning Network is a scaling solution for Bitcoin that promises
to enable rapid and private payment processing. In Lightning, multi-
hop payments are secured by utilizing Hashed Time-Locked Con-
tracts (HTLCs) and encrypted on the network layer by an onion
routing scheme to avoid information leakage to intermediate nodes.
In this work, we however show that the privacy guarantees of the
Lightning Networkmay be subverted by an on-path adversary con-
ducting timing attacks on the HTLC state negotiationmessages. To
this end, we provide estimators that enable an adversary to reduce
the anonymity set and infer the likeliest payment endpoints. We
developed a proof-of-concept measurement node that shows the
feasibility of attaining time differences and evaluate the adversarial
success in model-based network simulations. We find that control-
ling a small number malicious nodes is sufficient to observe a large
share of all payments, emphasizing the relevance of the on-path
adversary model. Moreover, we show that adversaries of different
magnitudes could employ timing-based attacks to deanonymize
payment endpoints with high precision and recall.
1 INTRODUCTION
In the years since its introduction, Bitcoin [36] has proven the fea-
sibility of conducting financial transactions without a centralized
clearing house. While it enjoys increasing popularity around the
world, it has been shown that its open and transparent design se-
verely limits the achievable transaction throughput [11] as well
as the privacy on, both, the consensus [34] and networking lay-
ers [18].
Second-layer solutions, such as Bitcoin’s Lightning Network [43],
promise to mitigate these shortcomings by establishing a network
of off-chain payment channels, i.e., a payment channel network (PCN).
PCNs enable rapid payment processing between any two channel
endpoints without consulting the blockchain every time. That is,
incremental updates are negotiated locally instead of requiring a
global agreement. Local transactions are not only much faster, but
also do not leak information to noninvolved third parties. This lo-
cal negotiation is however only possible in a secure manner, be-
cause the parties deposit a collateral during channel establishment.
In combination with a clever exchange of multi-signature transac-
tions, the blockchain serves as a mechanism to resolve conflicts.
In addition to payments between neighboring nodes, the Light-
ning Network allows payments to traverse over multiple channels
in the network graph, i.e., multi-hop payments. Therefore, chan-
nel balances have to be updated atomically, which is enforced by
the utilization of Hashed Time-Locked Contract (HTLC) payment
protocols. In an attempt to avoid information leakage to interme-
diate nodes, sender and receiver exchange messages by applying
an onion routing encryption scheme; more specifically, the Sphinx
mix packet construction [12].
In this work, we however show that the privacy guarantees of
the Lightning Network may be subverted by an adversary con-
ducting timing attacks on the message exchange during payment
processing. In particular, an on-path adversary may reduce the
anonymity set of potential sender and receiver nodes based on
the payment amount and the HTLC’s time-lock delta value. Fol-
lowing this initial reduction of privacy, the adversary may apply
timing-based estimators to infer the likeliest payment path end-
points, potentially deanonymizing the sender and receiver of a pay-
ment. This attack is especially fatal, since countermeasures directly
conflict with the design goal of secure and rapid payments. More-
over, as our analysis shows, the single most central node is already
capable of observing close to 50% of all payments in the network,
while the four most central nodes observe an average of 72% pay-
ments. These findings are in accordance with recent results [50]
and emphasize the relevance of the on-path attacker model.
We expose that an adversary can probe the network and is able
to derive a model of edge latencies, which enables timing attacks.
Furthermore, we show how the observation of timing patterns, in-
herent to interactive multi-hop message exchanges, may be used
by the adversary to calculate time differences that correspond to
her distance from the respective payment endpoint. To this end, we
introduce timing-based estimators that first exclude invalid pay-
ment paths, before ranking candidate nodes according to their like-
lihood, i.e., return a maximum likelihood estimation. To confirm
the feasibility of retrieving such measurements, we developed a
proof-of-concept implementation of the measurement functional-
ity and deployed it on a segregated part of the Lightning Network
testnet. Furthermore, to enable evaluation of the attack vector in
larger scenarios, we developed a discrete-event network simula-
tor that allows to simulate the payment routing protocol based on
real-world snapshots of the public Lightning Network. Utilizing
the simulator, we study the timing attacks in scenarios modelling
adversarial capabilities of different magnitudes. The results show
that an adversary controlling more than 10 nodes could easily de-
anonymize payment sources and destinations with a precision of
more than 50%. The sensitivity highly depends on the malicious
nodes’ position in the network, though, but can reach up to 50%
recall. Moreover, we show that our time-based estimators are gen-
erally outperforming a First-Spy estimator, which serves as a base-
line. This superior result becomes particularly apparent when con-
sidering full deanonymization, i.e., the case in which the adversary
was able to correctly identify both payment endpoints.
To summarize our contributions, we (1) present a unified model
for the Lightning Network that captures the payment channel graph
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as well as properties of the underlying peer-to-peer network, (2)
propose a method for probing the network to build an (adversar-
ial) edge latency model, (3) introduce timing attacks on privacy in
payment channel networks that make use of time difference mea-
surements of interactive multi-hop message exchanges, and (4) an-
alyze the feasibility and adversarial success of the introduced at-
tack vector based on a proof-of-concept measurement node and
comprehensive network simulations.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2
gives a primer on the Lightning Network and its payment proto-
col. Section 3 introduces models and notations that serve as the
basis for our further analysis. In Section 4, we introduce timing at-
tacks on privacy in payment channel networks, and evaluate their
feasibility and adversarial success in Section 5. Section 7 discusses
related work, before Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 LIGHTNING NETWORK PRIMER
The Lightning Network is the most prevalent payment channel net-
work (PCN) to date, i.e., it is a network of payment channels that are
established between two endpoints by locking a certain amount of
funds (the channel capacity) on-chain, whose individual allocation
(the respective channel balances) can then be negotiated rapidly
between the two involved parties. Payments routed over multi-
ple intermediate channels allow to send money to only remotely
connected receivers while being secured through the application
of Hashed Time-Locked Contract (HTLC) payment protocols. The
HTLC protocol ensures that a forwarding intermediary node is re-
imbursed in the case of payment success, and in case of a failure
may still retrieve its locked funds after expiration of the time-lock
delta safety period. In the following, we give a technical overview
of the Lightning Network’s channel construction, routing, and pay-
ment processing mechanics.
2.1 Connection and Channel Establishment
A new peer joining the Lightning Network has first to establish a
network connection to a node connected to Lightning’s TCP-based
peer-to-peer overlay network. Since every node in the network
holds an associated long-term secp256k1 [8] public key by which
it is identified, all inter-peer communications following the initial
key exchange handshake are authenticated and encrypted based
on the Noise [42] protocol framework.
In order to initiate the establishment of a new payment chan-
nel to a neighboring node, the peer sends an open_channel mes-
sage that is typically answered by an accept_channel message,
through both of which the channels parameters, in particular the
channel capacity and initial balances, are negotiated. Using the ex-
changed information, the initiating peer is then able to issue a fund-
ing transaction which it broadcasts in the Bitcoin network. After
the funding transaction is confirmed on-chain, the channel is es-
tablished and may be used for payment processing. Furthermore,
if the new peer wants to act as payment hub, i.e., forward payments
for others, it can announce the node’s and channel’s existence to
the network by disseminating the respective node_announcement
and channel_announcement messages in the peer-to-peer network.
As these messages also contain the necessary routing information,
such as the channel capacity and associated routing fees, they are
A B C
invoice: H (r )
update_add_htlc: H (r ), ⊚
commitment_signed
revoke_and
_ack
commitment
_signed
revoke_and_ack
update_ful
fill_htlc: r
update_add_htlc: H (r ), ⊚
commitment_signed
revoke_and
_ack
commitment
_signed
revoke_and_ack
update_ful
fill_htlc: r
Figure 1: Message exchange during payment routing.
broadcasted in Lightning’s overlay network. These messages also
include the cltv_expiry_delta parameter, which allows a node
to declare the maximum time it is willing to have its funds locked
up in case an HTLC is not fulfilled in an orderly fashion.
2.2 Payment Routing
Let’s assume that Alice already connected her node A to the net-
work and established at least one channel over which she is able to
send and receive payments. If she now wants to send a payment to
a destination nodeC , she has to first find a suitable path in the net-
work and then has to setup the corresponding HTLC to conduct
the payment. In order to illustrate this example, the sequence of
exchanged messages is shown in Figure 1.
Initially, it is required for A and C to have some out-of-bounds
communication channel over which C can supply an invoice to
A that includes, without limitation, its identifying public key, the
amount to be paid, as well as the payment hash, i.e., the hash H (r )
of a random secret r . Based on the publicly available routing in-
formation, A then employs source routing in order to determine a
path toC that has sufficient capacity to possibly be able to route her
payment.While the behavior of the source routing algorithm is not
specified as part of the BOLT specifications [39], typically a mod-
ified version of Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm [15] that con-
siders routing fees and past payment success is utilized for route
selection. Note that this algorithm might fail, if there is no path of
sufficient capacity available. However, let’s assume without loss of
generality that this is not the case and the algorithm yields a path
over the intermediate node B.
Given this path, Alice is able to initiate the HTLC construction,
i.e., a number of conditional payments that eithermay be redeemed
by producing the pre-image r to the challenge H (r ) or would time
out after a certain lock-time. In order to facilitate the payment, A
calculates two essential values for each respective hop:
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(1) the amount this hop should forward, which is calculated by
adding the accruing fees for each respective hop to the pay-
ment amount, which is hence increasing towards the desti-
nation.
(2) the necessary remaining time-lock value for the outgoing
hop, which is decreasing towards the destination.
Alice then encodes this information in an onion routed packet
corresponding to the Sphinx packet scheme [12]. That is, the packet
is constructed through multiple layers of encryption, each wrap-
ping information identifying the next hop, the amount to forward,
as well as the remaining lock-time value. She then initiates the pay-
ment by sending a update_add_htlc message carrying the pay-
ment hash H (r ) as well as the onion packet (represented as ⊚) to
the next hop, i.e., B. The latter, as each intermediate node along the
payment path, is then able to decrypt the packet to receive its pay-
load and forward the HTLC offer to the next hop. However, B only
proceeds after the new conditional payment based on the challenge
H (r ) is is incorporated in the state of the affected payment chan-
nel and this state change is irrevocably committed through a hand-
shake of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
After the pending state updates have been negotiated, C for-
wards the HTLC by attaching the remainder of the onion packet
to an update_add_htlc message sent to the next hop, which pro-
ceeds in the same way. In case any of the intermediary nodes does
not agree with the payment, e.g., when the channel does not hold
a sufficient balance or fee and time-lock values determined A do
not meet their expectations, they may fail the HTLC by replying
with an update_fail_htlc message carrying failure message that
is onion-encrypted and propagated back along the path to the ori-
gin node A. As this may happen at any point in time, Lightning
does not provide any guarantees on payment reliability and hence
can be classified as a best-effort network.
Once the HTLC construction reaches the final destination, C
supplies the solution r to the payment hash challenge H (r ) via
a corresponding update_fulfill_htlc message, which is prop-
agated back on the inverse payment path, allowing intermediary
nodes to redeem their conditional payments. Thereby, they settle
the pending HTLC and gain the determined fee. Note that while
the commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages are only
exchanged between immediate neighbors, the update_add_htlc,
update_fulfill_htlc, and update_fail_htlc messages are for-
warded back and forth the payment path, which makes them ob-
servable by intermediate nodes.
3 MODEL
In the following, we introduce the models and notations that serve
as the basis for further analysis.
3.1 Network Model
As discussed in the previous section, PCNs typically exhibit multi-
ple layers: while inter-peer communication is handled by the peer-
to-peer network layer, the payments themselves are sent and for-
warded in the network of payment channels. While peers may join
the peer-to-peer network without establishing payment channels,
peers with an established payment channel have to be connected
in the peer-to-peer network. We in the following assume the peer-
to-peer network to be congruent with the channel layer and build
a unified model based on the public network of payment channels.
A PCNcan therefore bemodeled as a single graphG = (V, E,ϕ),
where V = {v0, . . . ,vn } is the set of the network’s nodes and
E = {e0, . . . , em} represent the set of edges, i.e., payment chan-
nels. Since every node may have multiple payment channels to
any other node, G is a loopless multigraph and ϕ : E → {{u,v} |
u,v ∈ V ∧ u , v} associates the set of edges with their endpoint
nodes.
In each direction, an edge e is associatedwith a balance bal(e,u,v)
that denotes the available balance from u tov on channel e , where
u,v ∈ ϕ(e). Edges also have an associated fee function, defined
by fee(a |e,u,v) that takes the payment amount a as a parameter
and yields the fees that accrue when forwarding over this channel.
Note that during routing directionality matters and hence balance
and fee functions are asymmetric. That is, generally bal(e,u,v) ,
bal(e,v,u) and fee(a |e,u,v) , fee(a |e,v,u). In contrast, the edge
capacity is symmetric and defined as the sumof balances, i.e., cap(e) =
bal(e,u,v)+bal(e,v,u). Furthermore, associatedwith the edges are
the respective time-lock delta values ∆tl(e,u,v) that indicate the
maximum time in block height the forwarding node is willing to
have its funds locked in case an HTLC fails. And lastly, the func-
tion lat(e) assigns a latency distribution to each network edge that
represents the network and processing delays, which are induced
when messages traverse the edge in the underlying peer-to-peer
network. Note that while balances and latencies are changing fre-
quently and are only known locally, fees, capacities, and time-lock
requirements are considered static and are publicly accessible by
all nodes in order to enable the source routing process. We denote
this public graph information as Gpub = (G, cap, fee,∆tl).
Based on this model of payment channel networks, we can now
introduce the following definitions.
Definition 3.1 (Payment). A payment is defined as the tuple
(s, t , a,∆max),
where s and t respectively denote the origin and destination nodes,
a is the amount sent by s , and∆max signifies themaximal total time
the payment amount may be locked.
Definition 3.2 (Path Validity). A path from node s to node t in
the network is a sequence of connecting edges, denoted as a tuple
p = (e0, e1, . . . , el ),
where ϕ(e0) = {s,v1},ϕ(e1) = {v1,v2}, . . . ,ϕ(el ) = {vl , t}.
A path p is called timelock-valid w.r.t. a total time-lock delta
∆max, if the remaining time the payment might be locked is smaller
than the time the forwarding node would be willing to accept, i.e.,
∀ei ∈ p, ui ,vi ∈ ϕ(ei ) : ∆tl(ei ,ui ,vi ) ≥ ∆max −
i−i∑
j=0
∆tl(ej ,uj ,vj )
Furthermore, a path p is capacity-valid w.r.t. an amount a, if all
edges have capacities higher than the forwarding amount includ-
ing accruing fee, i.e.,
∀ei ∈ p, ui ,vi ∈ ϕ(ei ) : cap(ei ) ≥ fi ,
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where fi is defined recursively as fl = a and fi−1 = fi+fee(fi |ei ,ui ,vi ).
Note that a path p being capacity-valid for amount a does not nec-
essarily imply that a payment of size a can actually be routed over
p.
A payment can be routed only if the path does not only exhibit
sufficient capacities, but also balances to forward the respective
amount,
∀ei ∈ p, ui ,vi ∈ ϕ(ei ) : bal(ei ,ui ,vi ) ≥ fi ,
in which case we call it balance-valid or a-routable.
Independently of this special case, however, we call a payment
path generally valid or just valid, if it is timelock-valid and capac-
ity valid. Note that therefore path validity describes if a path could
potentially be used to route a payment with respect to the param-
eters, not if it actually may be used or is being used.
Definition 3.3 (Routing Algorithm). A routing algorithm R is a
function that takes a payment x = (s, t ,a,∆max) and the public
graph information Gpub = (G, cap, fee,∆tl) as arguments and out-
puts a valid payment path, i.e.,
R(x |Gpub ) → p,
where p is a capacity-valid and timelock-valid path from s to t .
Definition 3.4 (Reachability). In the graph G, a node t is reach-
able from a node t if there is a path between them. Similarly, we
call t capacity-reachable,balance-reachable, or timelock-reachable from s ,
if there exists respectively a capacity-valid, balance-valid, or timelock-
valid path from s to t , w.r.t. a given payment (s, t ,a,∆max).
Note that these reachability notions induce subgraphsRcap,Rbal,
and R∆, where
G ⊇ Rcap ⊃ Rbal and G ⊇ R∆.
3.2 Adversary Model
3.2.1 Lightning’s Security Goals. Given payments are routed di-
rectly between source and destination nodes, secured by the HTLC
construction, and the path is obscured by employing the Sphinx-
based onion routing scheme, the Lightning Network aims to de-
liver the following security goals:
Balance security: No third party should be able to steal funds,
or otherwise alter channel balanceswithout the implicit con-
sent of the involved parties.
Off-path local unobservability: Only nodes on the payment
path should be informed about an occurring payment.1
Off-path value privacy Since all communications during pay-
ment processing are encrypted, only on-path nodes should
get to know the amounts forwarded.
On-path sender/receiver-anonymity: As every node only
knows its predecessor and successor on the payment path,
it should not be able to identify the sender or receiver of a
payment.
1Note however that this assumes a local perspective on the network. Payment unob-
servability may not hold when we assume a more powerful attacker model, such as
an adversary that has access to large parts of the underlying network infrastructure.
Such adversaries are known to be potentially capable of advanced deanonymization
attacks, and are notoriously hard to defeat. [22]
Receiver’s sender-anonymity: The receiver of a payment
should not be able to identify who initiated a payment. 2
3.2.2 Adversarial Goals and Capabilities. While the off-path unob-
servability of payments could potentially be subject of a deanonymiza-
tion attack run by a global passive adversary, in this work we ana-
lyze the feasibility of subverting the on-path anonymity properties
of nodes that send and receive payments. In particular, we focus
on attack vectors that allow a local adversary incorporating side-
channel information to potentially subvert on-path sender/receiver
anonymity as well as receiver’s sender-anonymity.
To this end, we assume an internal local adversary that controls
a set M = {m0, . . . , mk } of malicious nodes in the network that
act as payment-processing intermediaries, which in accordance
with literature may also be referred to as spies. We furthermore
assume that the adversarial nodes M behave according to proto-
col and are able to send and receive protocol-compatible messages,
e.g., in order to probe the network to build a latency model of their
surroundings.
When payments are routed over an adversarial nodemi ∈ M , it
keeps track of each network message msg arriving over the edge
em , as well as the corresponding timestamp, i.e., they store the
datasets
Di = {(mi , em , tmsg, msg)}.
Based on the merged datasetD =
⋃
i Di , the public graph data
Gpub , and the estimated link latencies l̂at, the adversary then aims
to associate any observed payments x = (s, t ,a,∆max) with the
respective source node s and destination node t . For this classifi-
cation, the adversary may apply different source and destination
estimators Ms andMt that given the input data yield a respective
estimation, i.e.,
Ms (x |D, Gpub , l̂at) = v̂s and Mt (x |D, Gpub , l̂at) = v̂t ,
where v̂s , v̂t ∈ V . For the sake of brevity, we in the following
refrain from always giving an exhaustive list of arguments and opt
to abbreviate notation asMs (x |D) andMt (x |D).
3.3 Anonymity Metrics
In order to quantify adversarial success and analyze the privacy
properties of the network, we utilize the following privacy metrics.
Well known performance measures for the adversarial success
of estimator-based deanonymization attacks are the combination
of precision and recall [17].
Assuming X being the set of all payments and C ⊆ X the set of
all payments observed and classified by the adversary. Let further-
moreXu ⊆ X denote the set of all payments that originate from (or
end at, in case of destination estimation) node u and analogously
Cu denote the set of payments classified to originate from (end at)
node u , i.e.,
Cu = {x | M(x |D) = u}.
Then the precision D of the estimatorV is defined as the share
of classified payments that were indeed correctly classified, i.e.,
D =
|Cu ∩ Xu |
|C |
.
2Notably, the Lightning Network currently does not guarantee the inverse, i.e., the
possibility for a receiver to stay anonymous. However, this may feasible in the future,
when the currently discussed Rendez-Vous Routing proposal is implemented. [14]
Timing Aacks on Privacy in Payment Channel Networks
The estimator’s recall R however is the share of all payments in
the network that were correctly classified,
R =
|Cu ∩ Xu |
|X |
.
A unified measure for the accuracy of an estimator is given by
the harmonic mean of precision and recall, also known as the F1-
measure:
F1 = 2 ·
D · R
D + R
.
4 TIMING ATTACKS ON PRIVACY
In the following, we describe the steps necessary to conduct timing
attacks on privacy in payment channel networks.
4.1 Improving Topological Advantage
The attacker wants to maximize the number of payment paths it
is included in by the victim’s routing algorithm. While the client-
side routing behavior is not standardized as part of Lightning’s
BOLT specifications, most implementations of the Lightning pro-
tocol rely on modified versions of Dijkstra’s shortest path algo-
rithm [15] that consider the channel fees as well as other param-
eters. Note that, as recent literature has observed [35], more than
90% of today’s Lightning Network nodes run the LND implementa-
tion of the Lightning protocol. In the following, we therefore as-
sume LND to be the default implementation and use it as the base
of our further analysis. LND’s path finding algorithm selects candi-
date edges based on a weight function we that considers routing
fees for the routed amount a, as well as a risk factor rf that aims
to capture the worst-case lock time:
we = fee(v |a,e,u) + a · ∆tl(e,u,v) · rf ,
where rf = 1.5 · 10
−8 is the default configuration.
Therefore, by setting time lock parameters and channel fees to
the minimal allowed values, the adversary can minimize the rout-
ing weight function of the victim’s client software, and thereby
maximize the probability that at least one of the malicious nodes
is included in the payment path. Tochner et al. [50] studied this
kind of route hijacking in the context of denial-of-service attacks.
They showed that at the time of writing ten nodes are part of 80%
of all payment paths, and 30 nodes of over 95% of payment paths.
Furthermore, while the problem of optimal edge additions for max-
imum betweenness centrality has previously been show to be NP-
hard [2, 5, 16], the authors provide a greedy algorithm with which
an adversary improve its topological advantage. To this end, they
were able to show that the creation of only fifteen edges would
suffice to hijack more than 80% of LND payment paths. Their obser-
vations are generally in accordance with our findings regarding
adversarial path inclusion (cf. Section 5.3.2) and highlight the rele-
vance of the on-path attacker model.
4.2 Building the Latency Model
As a data basis for the classification of observed payments, the ad-
versary initially has to probe the network to retrieve characteris-
tic timing measurements. These measurements allow her to build
a model of latencies l̂at that are encountered when payments are
routed over a specific link, which then in turn are used as a priori
knowledge for the estimators.
4.2.1 Retrieving Path LatencyMeasurements. In order to probe for
the characteristic latency measurements, the adversary can exploit
the fact that due to Lightning’s use of the Sphinx packet format, in-
valid or failing payments can only be discovered by the node that
they are actually failing at. That is, as all nodes only see the parts of
onion-routed data they are able to encrypt and do not know the full
path’s properties, they have to optimistically forward all payment
requests based on the assumption that it will succeed. Therefore,
the adversary is able to craft payments that look valid to all inter-
mediaries, but are bound to fail at a specific hop along the path, e.g.,
because of insufficient fees or an invalid maximum time-lock value.
Utilizing this probing method, the adversary can record the time
difference between sending the initial update_add_htlc message
and retrieving the final update_fail_htlc to retrieve a measure-
ment that encompasses all delays that were encountered along the
measured payment path.
4.2.2 Estimating Edge Latencies. The adversarial node utilizes the
described probing method to retrieve a reliable model for paths
covering every link in the network. To this end, she iteratively in-
creases the probing path lengths and calculates link latencies by
subtracting the estimated latencies of partial paths. That is, the ad-
versarial nodemi starts by repeatedly probing paths lengths l = 1
that cover its immediate neighborsvj , i.e., p1 = (e1),mi ,vj ∈ ϕ(e1),
and calculates the mean µe1 and standard deviation σe1 values for
these links, i.e.,
µ̂e1 =
∑n
i=0 probei (p1)
T · n
,
σ̂e1 =
√∑n
i=0(probei (p1) − µ̂e1 )
2
T · n
,
where T is a normalizing factor accounting for the number of link
traversals incurred during the message exchange over the mea-
sured hop. In this case, we assume T = 4, i.e., three traversals for
commitment_signed and for the revoke_and_ack handshake and
one for update_fulfill_htlc (see Figure 1).
The adversary can then increase the path lengths and iteratively
build the latency model for these longer paths pl = (e1, . . . , el ):
µ̂el =
∑n
i=0 probei (pl )
T · n
− µ̂el−1 − . . . − µ̂e1 ,
σ̂el =
√∑n
i=0(probei (pl ) − µ̂e1 )
2
T · n
+ ... + σ̂2el−1 + σ̂
2
el .
Given these parameters, the adversary can build the normally
distributed edge latency model as
l̂at(ei ) = N(µ̂ei , σ̂
2
ei ).
Note that this model does not just include the network delay,
but also incorporates any processing delays arising on the inter-
mediate nodes. As this unified latency model captures various side
effects, we can refrain from considering them separately in the at-
tack estimators.
Moreover, modeling timing behavior in such an approximative
way is bound to induce a certain margin of error. This uncertainty
is expressed by the variances growing with increasing lengths of
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t
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Figure 2: Payment routed overmalicious observation points.
themeasured paths. In the followingwe therefore propose amethod
to aggregate the timing models from multiple malicious vantage
points to increase overall accuracy.
4.2.3 Model Aggregation. As the adversary may control multiple
nodes in the network to increase the probability of inclusion in
payment paths, each malicious node may create a timing model
from their point of view. As themargin of error increases with each
additional hop in themeasured paths, the aggregated model should
not simply average over all measurements. Instead, it merges the
individual model by applying an arithmetic mean weighted with
the reciprocal distance from the measured node, i.e.,
∀mi ∈ M,vi ∈ V : wi =
1
d(vi ,mi )
,
µ̂e,tot =
∑n · |M |
i=0 wi µ̂i,e∑n · |M |
i=0 wi
,
σ̂e,tot =
√√∑n · |M |
i=0 wi (µ̂i,e − µ̂e,tot )
2∑n · |M |
i=0 wi
.
The adversary therefore retrieves the aggregated latency model
l̂attot (ei ) = N(µ̂e,tot , σ̂
2
e,tot ).
4.3 Estimator-based Deanonymization Attack
In order to be able to deanonymize the sender and receiver of a
payment, it has to be routed over at least one observation point
controlled by the adversary (see Figure 2). In contrast to previous
approaches that apply a First-Spy estimator that simply estimates
the node adjacent to the point of observation to be the payment’s
respective endpoint, our approach builds a maximum likelihood es-
timator (MLE) over all paths the observed payment could possibly
have taken. To this end, the malicious nodes record the time dif-
ferences of interactive message exchanges and, after reducing the
candidate set by considering only valid paths (see Definition 3.2),
estimate the source or destination of the payment according to the
likelihood that the time differences stem from a message exchange
over this particular path.
4.3.1 Recording TimeDifferences. To utilize the timing ofmessages
in order to estimate the source or destination of a payment, the
adversarial nodes M have to observe end-to-end transmitted mes-
sages belonging to the same payment at two different points in
time, i.e., t0 and t1. This allows to calculate the time difference
δt = t1 − t0 it took the observed payment to travel from the first
point of observationm0 ∈ M to the source or destination, and back
to the second point of observationm1 ∈ M .
In particular, the malicious intermediate nodes record the point
in time t0 when they forward a payment via update_add_htlc
and t1 upon receipt of the corresponding update_fulfill_htlc,
which yields a time difference δt corresponding to the distance to
the payment’s destination (cf. Figure 1). In this case, the adversary
does not have to interfere with the payment processing protocol
in order to collect the necessary information to conduct destina-
tion estimation. Hence, the adversary acts in a purely honest-but-
curious model, and therefore cannot be detected by outside parties.
However, since the message exchange from the source node to
the intermediate node is non-interactive, an advanced attack strat-
egy is required in order to retrieve suitable timingmeasurements in
this direction. To this end, the adversary intentionally fails the first
observed payment attempt by sending a update_fail_message.
She also records the current time as t0. After receiving the failure
message, the payment’s sender is forced to retry the failed attempt,
which is typically done immediately to avoid further delays. When
the second payment attempt is observed at time t1, the adversary
can calculate the δt = t1 − t0 value which corresponds to its dis-
tance from the source node.
In general, the chosen paths and points of observation may be
different, in which case the adversary has only a certain chance
of observing the second payment attempt. While this would intro-
duce additional uncertainty to this part of the adversarial strategy,
as we discuss later in Section 5.2, the adversary may force a sender
to send the second payment attempt over the same path as before,
which removes this uncertainty. This is possible in practice due to
an implementation detail of LND.
We therefore in the following assume the two observations to
occur at the same malicious node, i.e., m0 = m1. Moreover, in the
case that multiple malicious nodes are part of the payment path
and observe the payment, the source or destination estimation is
based on themeasurements recorded by themalicious node closest
to the respective endpoint.
4.3.2 Source and Destination Estimation. The estimation of source
and destination of a payment relies on selecting the likeliest paths
the payment could have taken before it arrived at the observation
points. Therefore, in order to reduce the initial uncertainty, the
adversary excludes paths that are capacity-unreachable or time-
lock unreachable given the observed amount aobs and ∆obs , i.e.,
she only considers nodes in
Rcap ∩ R∆ ⊆ Gpub .
The adversary then builds candidate aggregated latency distri-
butions
l̂atp = Tobs · l̂at(eobs ) + ... +Tl · l̂at(el )
for each candidate path p = (eobs , ..., el ), where eobs denotes the
edge the measurement was conducted through. Furthermore, the
weights Ti denote the number of messages that would have been
exchanged over the edge ei . Note that the possibility of such an
aggregation relies on the fact that the sum of normally distributed
variables may be calculated as
N(µ1,σ
2
1 ) +N(µ2,σ
2
2 ) = N(µ1 + µ2,σ
2
1 + σ
2
2 ).
Timing Aacks on Privacy in Payment Channel Networks
Algorithm 1: Source / Destination Estimator
Function estimate δt , aobs , ∆obs , eobs , Gpub
remove all capacity-invalid paths from Gpub
remove all timelock-invalid paths from Gpub
forall v ∈ V do
initialize
end
vf st ← get_neighbor(eobs ) // First hop is known
queue_candidate(vf st )
l̂atf st ← Tobs · l̂at(eobs )
path_lats[vf st ]← {l̂at(eobs )}
likelihood[vf st ]← l̂atf st (δt )
while vcur ← next_unvisited() do
Dcur ← path_lats[vcur ]
l̂atcur ←
∑
di ∈Dcur
Ti · di // Aggregate dists.
pcur ← l̂atcur (δt )
forall vn in neighbors(vcur ) do
en ← cheapest_edge(vcur , vn)
Dn ← Dcur ∪ {l̂at(en)}
l̂atn ←
∑
di ∈Dn
Ti · di
pn ← l̂atn (δt )
pold ← likelihood[vn]
if pn ≤ pcur or pn ≤ pold then
skip // Only increasing likelihood
end
likelihood[vn]← pn // Update candidate
path_lats[vn]← Dn
queue_candidate(v)
end
end
forall visited v do
return candidate with max. likelihood
end
end
Then, the adversary ranks all candidate paths according to the
likelihood that the observed time difference δt was drawn from the
respective aggregated distribution, maxp (l̂atp (δt )), and estimates
the final hop of the path to be the payment’s source or destination.
Therefore, the adversary generally would have to rank all pos-
sible paths in the network. However, Algorithm 1 implements the
estimators Ms / Mt as an iterative algorithm that traverses the
graph starting from the point of observation. During execution, it
adds new candidate paths as long as they would result in an in-
creased likelihood of observing δt , and stops when all candidate
paths have been visited.
5 EVALUATION
In the following, we evaluate the feasibility, accuracy, and reliabil-
ity of the presented attacks on privacy in payment channel net-
works.
5.1 Ethical Considerations
Research on the security and privacy of live communication sys-
tems is always in danger of infringing on the rights of the partic-
ipating individuals. In accordance with the Menlo Report [4], we
aim to minimize our interference with the live network as well as
the data collected from unknowing parties.
That is, in order to evaluate the presented attacks on privacy
in payment channel networks, we pursue a two-pronged strategy:
First we show the feasibility of the attacks through a proof-of-
concept implementation that was installed on an entirely segre-
gated part of the Lightning Network testnet, which ensures that
no involuntary parties were affected by our experiments.
Second, to be able to evaluate larger attack scenarios and ana-
lyze the effect these attacks have on the network’s privacy overall,
we rely on model-based network simulation that is not connected
in any way to unknowing individuals and hence does not raise
any ethical concerns. In particular, while the simulations utilize la-
tency measurements that were retrieved through external means,
i.e., ICMP ping on nodes from the public internet, we explicitly re-
frain from conducting internal latency measurements as discussed
in Section 4.2, since such measurements could interfere with the
functionality of the network.
5.2 Proof-of-Concept Implementation
The described attacks on payment privacy in payment channel net-
works rely on the ability of malicious intermediary nodes to re-
trieve latency measurements from the source and to the destina-
tion of an observed payment. As a proof of concept that obtaining
these measurements is indeed practical, we implemented a respec-
tive plugin for c-lightning [10].3
5.2.1 Retrieving Latencies toDestination. When the plugin is started
on the intermediary node, it registers to be notified of forwarded
payments. In particular, it utilizes the forward_event notification
to record the times t0 HTLC payment hashes H (r ) are first ob-
served, as well as the times t1 they are marked as resolved. The
plugin furthermore records the node identifier vM of the measure-
ment node and the identifier enext of the channel the payment was
forwarded over. That is, it records the tuple (H (r ),uM , enext , t0, t1)
that is then ready to be used as input a payment destination esti-
mator.
5.2.2 Retrieving Latencies from Source. Because the communica-
tion with the payment source is non-interactive, the adversary has
to rely on observing retried payment attempts, as discussed above.
To this end, the proof-of-concept implementation makes use of the
htlc_accepted hook provided c-lightning’s plugin API in order
to intercept incoming update_add_htlc messages. When a pay-
ment with a previously unobserved payment hashH (r ) is observed,
the plugin records a corresponding timestamp t0 and rejects the
payment attempt. As the payment is is then retried, the timestamp
t1 of the second observation by an adversarial intermediary node is
recorded. This hence allows the adversary to estimate the latency
from the source and record the tuple (H (r ),uM , eprev , t0, t1).
3Proof-of-concept and simulator source codes, as well as utilized data sets, arepublicly
available in our companion repository at https://gitlab.tu-berlin.de/rohrer/cdt-data
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Figure 3: Experimental Testnet Setup
While it is not guaranteed to observe the second payment, the
proof-of-concept implementation is able to force the payment source
to reuse the same payment path by exploiting a weakness in the
interplay of Lightning’s network protocol and LND-specific appli-
cation behavior. That is, as channel updates may occur in the mid-
dle of a payment attempt, LND elects not to penalize intermediary
nodes during route selection, if they report a channel policy failure,
i.e., fail the payment with amount_below_minimum, fee_insufficient,
incorrect_cltv_expiry, or channel_disabled failure codes [27,
37]. Note that LND once a minute grants such nodes a “second
chance”, independently of whether the returned channel policies
entail an actually meaningful update [26]. This allows our plugin
to fail the first observed payment attempt with a corresponding
update_fail_htlc failure message, which prompts the LND end-
point to immediately retry the payment over the same malicious
intermediary node, effectively enabling reliable latency measure-
ments.4
5.2.3 Experimental Testnet Setup. In order to confirm the feasibil-
ity of retrieving the required time differences, we deployed an ex-
perimental setup on a segregated part of Lightning’s testnet net-
work. As shown in Figure 3, we deployed three nodes A,B,C run-
ning LND and one malicious node M running c-lightning with
our proof-of-concept plugin. Between these nodes, channels were
created so that the source node A would have two possible paths
to send payments to destination nodeC : one over the benign node
B, and one over M . While the channels between the benign nodes
were configuredwith default fee settings (base_fee = 1 and fee_rate =
0.00001), the malicious M set its channel fees to 0 to increase its
probability of payment path inclusion.
We then sent payments in one minute intervals from node A to
node C . For all payments, node A chose the path (A,M,C), which
provesM’s strategy to be successful. Moreover, as discussed above,
M would in each case reject the first payment attempt and only
proceed on the second try, allowing it to retrieve latency measure-
ments for both source nodeA aswell as destination nodeC . It there-
fore confirms that we can retrieve the time differences that pose
the basis for our timing attacks. As the next step, we can use the
measurements to feed our estimators, which would infer source
and destination.
5.3 Network Simulations
5.3.1 Simulator & Simulation Model. In order to enable a larger-
scale evaluation of the feasibility and impact of timing attacks on
privacy, we developed a network simulator that allows to simulate
4Note that as of this writing, a small change in the c-lightning source code is nec-
essary to enable a plugin to return failure codes entailing a channel policy update. A
corresponding patch can be found in our companion repository.
payment routing in the Lightning Network based on real-world
data.3
The simulator consists of around 3,000 lines of Rust code that im-
plement the network model introduced in Section 3, as well as the
logic to run time-discrete simulations of multi-hop payments. To
this end, it recreates the multigraph of network nodes and edges
as well as the necessary associated data (such as capacities, bal-
ances, time-lock deltas, etc.) from a network snapshot. Each node
can queue events in simulation time, i.e., a monotonically increas-
ing clock with a resolution of 1 ns. This allows to simulate message
exchange according to times sampled from the underlying latency
model, without introducing unnecessary side-effects, even when
the events happen concurrently. The messaging logic mimics the
Lightning payment protocol, making it possible to simulate and
measure time differences in themessage exchange, e.g., as depicted
in Figure 1. In order to find payment paths, the simulator adopts
the weight-based variant of Dijkstra’s algorithm from the LND im-
plementation (see Section 4.1).
The latency model is based on a measurement study conducted
in the Lightning network inMarch 2020. In this study, we retrieved
ICMP ping measurements to each reachable IPv4 address in the
Lightning Network from various geographically distributed van-
tage points. For more details, we refer the reader to Appendix A.
While initializing the graph model, the simulator assigns a latency
distribution to each edge based on the respective geographic re-
gions of the connected nodes. In case a node only advertises a
.onion address, i.e., is run behind a Tor hidden service, a random
geographic location is assigned.
For the following analysis, the simulator was parametrized with
a snapshot of the Lightning Network that was retrieved on May
1, 2020. Initial balance distributions between channel endpoints
were assumed to be a 50/50 split of channel capacities. If not stated
otherwise, in each simulated scenario 1,000 payments of varying
amounts were sent between random network nodes, and each sce-
nario was repeated 30 times with different seed values for the simu-
lator’s randomnumber generator to ensure stastistical significance.
In the following, we are considering three main adversarial sce-
narios: mcentral, mrandom, and lnbig. While in the mcentral case
them highest ranked nodes with respect to their betweenness cen-
trality are under control of the adversary, mrandom acts as a base-
line inwhich she only controlsm nodes chosen by uniform random
sampling. A special case is the lnbig scenario, in which we study
the potential capabilities of the 26 high-capacity nodes controlled
by the single entity “LNBIG.com”.
5.3.2 Share of Compromised Paths. In order to evaluate the rele-
vance of the on-path adversary model, we analyze how likely it is
that payments may be observed by adversaries of different mag-
nitudes. In each network scenario, we simulated payments of dif-
ferent amounts (1, 10, 100, 1,000, 10,000, and 100,000 satoshis) be-
tween randomly chosen nodes and counted the times a malicious
node was part of the path returned by the routing algorithm.
Figure 4 shows the share of compromised paths for network sce-
narios in which the adversary controls the m ∈ {1, .., 30} most
central or random nodes, as well as for the lnbig scenario. As this
corresponds to the definition of betweenness centrality, it comes
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Figure 4: Share of compromised payment paths.
to no surprise that the most central nodes observe a high and in-
creasing number of paths. However, it is noteworthy that the sin-
gle most central node is included in 37% to around 49% of payment
paths, depending on the chosen amount. Additionally, the share
of compromised paths follows an initial steep increase, allowing
an adversary in control of the four most central nodes to already
observe an average of 72%, and one in control of 30 most central
nodes to be included in 90% of payment paths.
In contrast, an adversary controlling randomly placed nodes
may at best observe an average of 5% of payments. Moreover, an
adversary controlling the 26 lnbig nodes can observe between 11%
and 25% of payments, averaging at 15%.
Generally, the payments with the highest amount result in the
highest shares of compromised paths. This is most likely the case
since more central nodes tend to optimize their fee policies and are
also well-connected capacity wise, i.e., are more likely part of the
few paths that can route higher-amount payments. However, one
exception to this rule can be observed in the case of lnbig, where
the 1 satoshi case yields the highest chance of path inclusion at
25%. We assume this to be the case because of LNBIG’s position-
ing in the network and since their nodes feature a high amount of
channels with base_fee set to 0, making them more likely to be
chose by the routing algorithm for low-amount payments.
5.3.3 Adversarial Success. In the case of an adversary aiming to
deanonymize payments, the performance with which she can cor-
rectly guess the source or destination of a message is also a mea-
sure of (remaining) user privacy. We therefore analyze how suc-
cessful adversaries of different magnitudes would be if they would
run the proposed timing-based attacks by applying the source esti-
matorMs,T and destination estimatorMt,T. As a baseline for com-
parison, we also implemented and simulated the First-Spy estima-
tors Ms,FS and Mt,FS that respectively deem the predecessor of
the first point of observation and the successor of the last point of
observation to be source and destination of the observed payment.
The upper row of Figure 5 shows the success of the different es-
timators in dependence of the evaluated scenarios and number of
malicious nodes. As can be seen in the top left plot, the precision
with which the adversary estimates the correct sources or desti-
nations is generally correlated with the number of controlled mali-
cious nodes. In case of the mcentral scenario, the precision of each
estimator roughly follows a logarithmic growth function, where
the First-Spy destination estimatorMt,FS performs the worst rang-
ing from 0.22 for a single controlled node to 0.52 for 30 malicious
nodes. In contrast, the timing-based destination estimator Mt,T
yields the highest accuracy that ranges from 0.45 to 0.75. Compa-
rably, a potential adversary controlling the 26 lnbig nodes would
be able to correctly identify senders or receivers with a precision
ranging from 0.69 forMs,FS to 0.73 forMt,T. These high estimation
results can be attributed to the favorable positioning of LNBIG’s
nodes in the network topology. In similar vein, it can be observed
that randomly placed malicious nodes, as in the mrandom scenrio,
may actually guess the correct senders and receivers with quite
high accuracy, as they cover the network graph more uniformly.
However, as shown in the top-middle plot of Figure 5, lnbig
and mrandom nodes clearly do not perform as well in terms of recall.
While the share of correctly attributed payments barely reaches 2%
in the best case (Mt,T,m = 30), lnbig is also only able to estimate
the correct endpoints in 10% of all payments at best. Notably, the
most central nodes have the highest recall, ranging between 7%
(Mt,FS ,m = 1) and 55% of payments. Of course, the recall is highly
correlated with the share of observed payments paths discussed in
the previous subsection.
Therefore, in order to provide a unified measure that allows to
analyze and compare the overall accuracy of estimators, the top-
right plot of Figure 5 shows the corresponding F1-Measure. In all
cases, it shows that the First-Spy baseline is outperformed by the
timing-based estimators, which reach up to an F1 score of 0.62 for
mcentral, Mt,T, andm = 30. It is however noteworthy that while
the timing-based source estimator always performs better than its
First-Spy counterpart, it doesn’t do so by a significant margin in
some scenarios. This happens when themalicious nodes are placed
close to the source node of the payment paths, which is generally
the case for the high number of short payment paths and the more
distributed node positioning of the lnbig scenario in particular. In-
terestingly, we also found that the weight-based routing algorithm
(see Section 4.1) puts edges tomore central (hence, in the mcentral
case, more malicious) nodes at the beginning of payment paths,
which increases the success cases of the First-Spy source estima-
tor.
In order to give a overall comparison of timing-based attacks
on privacy to the First-Spy approach, we analyzed the number of
payments that were fully deanonymized, i.e., the number of pay-
ments for which the adversary was able to correctly identify source
and destination. To this end, the bottom row of Figure 5 shows the
precision, recall, and F1-measure with which the adversary could
totally deanonymize payments given the estimators MFS and MT.
Of course, as this considers a subset of the correct results of each
individual estimator, all measures are lower. However, the results
generally follow the same behavior as just discussed. Notably, the
timing-based estimator outperforms the end-to-end deanonymiza-
tion performance of the First-Spy approach in every case of ev-
ery scenario and in precision, recall, as well as F1-measure. It does
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Figure 5: Adversarial success in dependence of number of malicious nodes.
so in particular in the mcentral scenarios, in which it attack suc-
cess is reliably higher than the baseline by factor 1.5. Thereby, our
simulation results confirm the feasibility and improved adversar-
ial success of timing-based attacks on privacy in payment channel
networks.
6 DISCUSSION
In the following, we discuss possible steps towards attack mitiga-
tion, the impact of upcoming changes to the Lightning protocol, as
well as avenues of future research.
6.1 Possible Countermeasures
The feasibility of timing attacks relies on the possibility to build a
reliable model of latencies, and on the adversary’s capability of ob-
serving and correlating of suitable interactive multi-hop message
exchanges, such as the current update_add_htlc, update_fail_htlc,
and update_fulfill_htlc message payloads.
Therefore, in order to impair the retrieval of timing measure-
ments, message replies could be delayed for a random amount of
time by the Lightning nodes, along the lines of Bitcoin’s transac-
tion trickling scheme [18] or a timed mix network. However, this
would of course significantly delay payment processing and there-
fore directly conflict with Lightning’s goal of enabling quick pay-
ments. It would furthermore counteract recent efforts to reduce
end-to-end payment latencies, such as Boomerang proposal [3].
Moreover, the adversary’s capability of correlating payment ob-
servations could be impaired, e.g., by introducing a payment scheme
that does not leak identifying payment features, such as today’s
payment hash, such as anonymousmulti-hop locks [30]. Note how-
ever, that even given such a scheme, payment observations may
still be correlated through metadata analysis, as timing and pay-
ment amounts. Furthermore, as an individual node still needs to
be able to match incoming and outgoing network messages, such
decorrelation would only protect of re-identifying the same pay-
ment in the network, i.e., mitigate full deanonymization. Very likely,
the individual source or destination estimators could still be ap-
plied.
6.2 Impact of Protocol Changes
The issue of payment path distinguishability based on time-lock
deltas was identified by the developers of the Lightning protocol
some time ago, which lead to the introduction of so-called shadow
routes to the Lightning standard [38]. The idea behind shadow routes
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is to add a random padding to the overall time-delta value of pay-
ments, so that the set of possible destinations would not be iden-
tified by a remaining lock time of 0. That said, different imple-
mentations of Lightning handle the random padding differently,
and, to the best of our knowledge LND currently does not imple-
ment shadow routes [28] at all. In order to estimate what impact
shadow routes would have on the accuracy of timing-based des-
tination estimatorsMt,T, we re-evaluated the scenarios discussed
in Section 5.3 while disabling timelock-based anonymity set reduc-
tion. Even though this corresponds to a worst-case estimation, we
found the decrease in precision and recall of the estimator to be
only 2-3%, indicating that most of its performance is based on the
timing-based maximum likelihood estimation.
The currently discussed proposal for Rendez-Vous Routing [14]
would allow for the creation of partial onion messages that include
the payloads for only a suffix of the payment path. These par-
tial onion messages could then be handed to an untrusted party,
which would be able to complete the payment path by supplying
a suitable prefix to the rendez-vous point. This construction bears
resemblance to Tor’s hidden services and would allow for receiver-
anonymous payments, i.e., would allow users to send payments
whose location in the network they are not aware of. While the im-
plementation of this proposal would therefore generally improve
Lightning Network’s privacy, it would likely not interfere with the
feasibility of timing attacks.
As sending large payments given the current channel capaci-
ties is often unsuccessful, schemes allowing to split payments and
route them over different paths, such as the recently implemented
multi-part payments, have been discussed for some time in the
Lightning community. As each individual payment carries only
part of the overall amount, they provide increased value privacy,
since the adversary is less likely to observe all payments and can-
not infer the actual transaction volume. However, as this results
in a higher number of closely correlated payments, an adversary
has a higher probability to observe such payments, whereby the
sender/receiver anonymity is decreased.
6.3 Future Research
Our analysis of timing attacks is based on themodel of public Light-
ning nodes, as introduced in Section 3. However, the Lightning pro-
tocol also allows for the establishment of hidden payment channels
that are only known to the adjacent neighbors and are not broad-
casted in the public peer-to-peer network. As the estimators of
course presuppose the knowledge of the underlying channel graph
to be able to return the candidate endpoint of maximum likelihood,
they are bound to fail in these circumstances. Therefore, applying
methods from the research area of topology inference [13, 40] in or-
der to detect hidden channels would be an interesting avenue for
future research.
In our network simulations, we furthermore observed cases in
which the timing estimators wrongly identified the endpoints of
unusually long payment paths as the candidates with maximum
likelihood. This is often the case when these paths consist of many
edges with small mean latencies, which then results in an aggre-
gated distribution that is closer to the measured time difference
than the correct candidate. Recently, Kappos et al. [23] proposed a
model for endpoint deanonymization based on a probability distri-
bution over payment path lengths. We think that integrating such
an approach could help to exclude such unusually long paths and
hence further improve the results of timing-based attacks on pri-
vacy.
7 RELATED WORK
A large body of literature is concerned with the privacy of cryp-
tocurrency transactions. While initially most research mainly fo-
cussed on the privacy provisions of the consensus layer [34, 45],
more recent work discussed deanonymization attacks on the peer-
to-peer layer [6, 24], what privacy properties it can provide [18],
and how it may be improved [17, 53]. Very recently, Tramer et
al. [51] have shown that timing-based side-channel information
and traffic analysis may be used to attack the privacy guarantees
of Zcash and Monero cryptocurrency transactions.
Also, more and more work studies the possibility of attacks on
the security and privacy of second-layer solutions in general and
payment channel networks in particular. It has been shown that
the Lightning Network is vulnerable to channel exhaustion, node
isolation [44], as well as congestion attacks [35]. Tochner et al.
showed that the routing algorithms employed by PCNs may be
manipulated to in order to facilitate inclusion of a malicious node
in the payment path, thereby increasing the danger of denial-of-
service attacks [50]. Furthermore, recent entries have discussed
the possibility of discovering the private channel balances by prob-
ing [21, 52] and analyzed how much privacy could be retained, if
noisy channel balances were to be made public [48]. A number of
papers analyzed the graph-theoretic properties of the Lightning
Network graph and discussed possible consequences regarding de-
centralization and routing [25, 44, 47], as well as graph-based pri-
vacy properties [31]. Similarly, Beres et al. [9] and Tikhomirov
et al. [49] empirically analyzed the privacy properties of PCNs
with the assistance of model-based traffic simulation. While both
of these entries discuss the possibility of deanonymization attacks,
they essentially apply a variant of the first-spy estimator, i.e., esti-
mate immediate predecessors and successors to be senders/receivers.
Concurrently to ourwork, Kappos et al. [23] refine prior approaches
of traffic simulation and introduce a probabilistic model based on
observed path lengths in order to estimate probable payment end-
points. Moreover, while a recent entry by Nisslmüller et al. [41]
mention the possibility of timing attacks, their investigation re-
mains in a preliminary state. To the best of our knowledge, our
work is therefore the first to study the impact and feasibility of
timing attacks on privacy in payment channel networks in depth.
Orthogonally, a growing body of contributions aims to improve
the privacy guarantees of second-layer solutions. While some de-
signs allow to anonymously transact over private payment hubs [19,
20], privacy-preserving routing mechanisms [33, 46] promise to
enable anonymous transactions over multiple intermediaries, i.e.,
payment channel networks. Malavolta et al. proposed provably se-
cure private payment protocols [29] and introduced a Lightning-
compatible anonymous locking mechanism based on ECDSA sig-
natures that allows for the decorrelation of payment paths [30].
While they would not entirely mitigate the possibility of timing
attacks, the adoption of such anonymous multi-hop locks would
Elias Rohrer and Florian Tschorsch
force an adversary to take additional error-pronemeasures for pay-
ment correlation, which would likely result in reduced estimator
precision.
8 CONCLUSION
In this work, we studied potential timing attacks on privacy in pay-
ment channel networks. We showed the feasibility of retrieving
the required time-differences through a proof-of-concept measure-
ment node and evaluated the impact of this attack vector based on
larger-scale network simulations. As the results confirm the im-
proved adversarial success, we conclude that timing attacks on
privacy may subvert Lightning’s design goals of fast and private
cryptocurrency transactions.
REFERENCES
[1] 2017. (Dallas, TX, USA).
[2] Zeta Avarikioti, Lioba Heimbach, YuyiWang, and RogerWattenhofer. 2019. Ride
the Lightning: The Game Theory of Payment Channels. CoRR abs/1912.04797
(2019).
[3] Vivek Bagaria, Joachim Neu, and David Tse. 2019. Boomerang: Redundancy
Improves Latency and Throughput in Payment Networks. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1910.01834 (2019).
[4] Michael Bailey, DavidDittrich, Erin Kenneally, and DouglasMaughan. 2012. The
Menlo Report. IEEE Secur. Priv. 10, 2 (2012), 71–75.
[5] Elisabetta Bergamini, Pierluigi Crescenzi, Gianlorenzo D’Angelo, Henning Mey-
erhenke, Lorenzo Severini, and Yllka Velaj. 2018. Improving the Betweenness
Centrality of a Node by Adding Links. ACM Journal of Experimental Algorith-
mics 23 (2018).
[6] Alex Biryukov, Dmitry Khovratovich, and Ivan Pustogarov. [n.d.]. Deanonymi-
sation of Clients in Bitcoin P2P Network. In CCS ’14: Proceedings of the 21st ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security (Scottsdale, AZ, USA,
2014-11). 15–29.
[7] Bitnodes. 2020. Homepage. Retrieved March 26, 2020 from https://bitnodes.io
[8] Daniel R. L. Brown. [n.d.]. SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Param-
eters. http://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf
[9] Ferenc Béres, István András Seres, and András A. Benczúr. 2019. A Cryptoe-
conomic Traffic Analysis of Bitcoins Lightning Network. CoRR abs/1911.09432
(2019). arXiv:1911.09432
[10] c-lightning Project. 2020. Github. Retrieved May 8, 2020 from
https://github.com/ElementsProject/lightning
[11] Kyle Croman, ChristianDecker, Ittay Eyal, Adem Efe Gencer, Ari Juels, Ahmed E.
Kosba, Andrew Miller, Prateek Saxena, Elaine Shi, Emin Gün Sirer, Dawn Song,
and Roger Wattenhofer. [n.d.]. On Scaling Decentralized Blockchains - A Posi-
tion Paper. In BITCOIN ’16: Proceedings of the 3rd Workshop on Bitcoin Research
(Christ Church, Barbados, 2016-02). 106–125.
[12] GeorgeDanezis and IanGoldberg. 2009. Sphinx: ACompact and Provably Secure
Mix Format. In SP ’09: Proceedings of the 30th IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy (Oakland, CA, USA, 2009-05). 269–282.
[13] Erik Daniel, Elias Rohrer, and Florian Tschorsch. [n.d.]. Map-Z: Exposing the
ZcashNetwork in Times of Transition. In LCN ’19: Proceedings of the 44th IEEE In-
ternational Conference on Local Computer Networks (Osnabrück, Germany, 2019-
10).
[14] Christian Decker. [n.d.]. Rendez-Vous Routing Proposal.
https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/rendez-vous/proposals/0001-rendez-vous.md
[15] Edsger W. Dijkstra. 1959. A note on two problems in connexion with graphs.
Numer. Math. 1 (1959), 269–271.
[16] Oguzhan Ersoy, Stefanie Roos, and Zekeriya Erkin. 2019. How to profit from
payments channels. CoRR abs/1911.08803 (2019).
[17] Giulia C. Fanti, Shaileshh Bojja Venkatakrishnan, Surya Bakshi, Bradley Denby,
Shruti Bhargava, Andrew Miller, and Pramod Viswanath. [n.d.]. Dandelion++:
Lightweight Cryptocurrency Networking with Formal Anonymity Guarantees.
2, 2 ([n. d.]), 29:1–29:35.
[18] Giulia C. Fanti and Pramod Viswanath. [n.d.]. Deanonymization in the Bitcoin
P2P Network. In NIPS ’17: Proceedings of 30th Annual Conference on Neural Infor-
mation Processing Systems (Long Beach, CA, USA, 2017-12).
[19] Matthew Green and Ian Miers. 2017. Bolt: Anonymous Payment Channels for
Decentralized Currencies, See [1], 473–489.
[20] Ethan Heilman, Leen Alshenibr, Foteini Baldimtsi, Alessandra Scafuro, and
Sharon Goldberg. 2017. TumbleBit: An Untrusted Bitcoin-Compatible Anony-
mous Payment Hub. In NDSS ’17: Proceedings of the 24th Annual Network and
Distributed System Security Symposium (San Diego, California, USA).
[21] Jordi Herrera-Joancomartí, Guillermo Navarro-Arribas, Alejandro Ranchal Pe-
drosa, Cristina Pérez-Solà, and Joaquín García-Alfaro. 2019. On the Difficulty
of Hiding the Balance of Lightning Network Channels. In AsiaCCS ’19: Proceed-
ings of the 2019 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security
(Auckland, New Zealand). 602–612.
[22] Aaron Johnson, ChrisWacek, Rob Jansen,Micah Sherr, and Paul Syverson. [n.d.].
Users Get Routed: TrafficCorrelation on Tor by Realistic Adversaries. In CCS ’13:
Proceedings of the 20th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Secu-
rity (Berlin, Germany, 2013-10). 337–348.
[23] George Kappos, Haaroon Yousaf, Ania Piotrowska, Sanket Kanjalkar, Sergi
Delgado-Segura, AndrewMiller, and SarahMeiklejohn. 2020. An EmpiricalAnal-
ysis of Privacy in the Lightning Network. arXiv preprint arXiv:2003.12470 (2020).
[24] Philip Koshy, Diana Koshy, and Patrick McDaniel. [n.d.]. An Analysis of
Anonymity in Bitcoin Using P2P Network Traffic. In FC ’14: Proceedings of the
18th International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security (Bar-
bados, 2014-03). 469–485.
[25] Jian-Hong Lin, Kevin Primicerio, Tiziano Squartini, Christian Decker, and Clau-
dio J. Tessone. 2020. Lightning Network: a second path towards centralisation
of the Bitcoin economy. CoRR abs/2002.02819 (2020). arXiv:2002.02819
[26] LND. 2020. Github Commit: Move Second
Chance Logic. Retrieved May 8, 2020 from
https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/commit/dc13da5abbfa429273b516abd566f6c6fa5bb200
[27] LND. 2020. Github: Policy Failure Logic. Retrieved May 8, 2020 from
https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/1354a461701b9396f0b4a35b01d308c5fcc0dbd2/routing/result_interpretation.go#L343
[28] Lightning Network Daemon LND. [n.d.]. Shadow Route Github Issue.
https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/1222
[29] Giulio Malavolta, Pedro Moreno-Sanchez, Aniket Kate, Matteo Maffei, and Sri-
vatsan Ravi. 2017. Concurrency and Privacy with Payment-Channel Networks,
See [1], 455–471.
[30] GiulioMalavolta, Pedro Moreno-Sanchez, Clara Schneidewind, Aniket Kate, and
Matteo Maffei. 2019. Anonymous Multi-Hop Locks for Blockchain Scalability
and Interoperability. In NDSS ’19: Prooceedings of the 26th Annual Network and
Distributed System Security Symposium (San Diego, California, USA).
[31] Stefano Martinazzi and Andrea Flori. 2020. The evolving topology of the
Lightning Network: Centralization, efficiency, robustness, synchronization, and
anonymity. PloS one 15, 1 (2020), e0225966.
[32] Inc. MaxMind. 2020. GeoIP GeoLite2 database. Retrieved March 26, 2020 from
https://dev.maxmind.com/geoip/geoip2/geolite2/
[33] Subhra Mazumdar, Sushmita Ruj, Ram Govind Singh, and Arindam Pal. 2020.
HushRelay: A Privacy-Preserving, Efficient, and Scalable Routing Algorithm for
Off-Chain Payments. CoRR abs/2002.05071 (2020). arXiv:2002.05071
[34] Sarah Meiklejohn, Marjori Pomarole, Grant Jordan, Kirill Levchenko, Damon
McCoy, Geoffrey M Voelker, and Stefan Savage. [n.d.]. A fistful of bitcoins:
characterizing payments among men with no names. In IMC ’13: Proceedings of
the 13th ACM SIGCOMM Conference on Internet Measurement (Barcelona, Spain,
2013-10). 127–140.
[35] Ayelet Mizrahi and Aviv Zohar. 2020. Congestion Attacks in Payment Channel
Networks. CoRR abs/2002.06564 (2020). arXiv:2002.06564
[36] Satoshi Nakamoto. [n.d.]. Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system.
[37] Lightning Network. [n.d.]. BOLT #4: Onion Routing Protocol.
https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md
[38] Lightning Network. [n.d.]. BOLT #7: P2P Node and Channel Discovery.
https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md
[39] Lightning Network. [n.d.]. BOLT In-Progress Specifications.
https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc
[40] Till Neudecker, Philipp Andelfinger, and Hannes Hartenstein. [n.d.]. Timing
Analysis for Inferring the Topology of the Bitcoin Peer-to-Peer Network. In
UIC ’16: Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Ubiquitous Intelli-
gence & Computing (Toulouse, France, 2016-07).
[41] Utz Nisslmueller, Klaus-Tycho Foerster, Stefan Schmid, and Christian Decker.
2020. Toward Active and Passive Confidentiality Attacks On Cryptocurrency
Off-ChainNetworks. In ICISSP ’20: Proceedings of the 6th International Conference
on Information Systems Security and Privacy (Valetta, Malta).
[42] Trevor Perrin. [n.d.]. The Noise Protocol Framework.
https://noiseprotocol.org/noise.pdf
[43] Joseph Poon and Thaddeus Dryja. [n.d.]. The bitcoin lightning network: Scalable
off-chain instant payments. ([n. d.]).
[44] Elias Rohrer, JulianMalliaris, and Florian Tschorsch. [n.d.]. Discharged Payment
Channels: Quantifying the Lightning Network’s Resilience to Topology-Based
Attacks. In S&B ’19: Proceedings of IEEE Security & Privacy on the Blockchain
(2019-06).
[45] Dorit Ron and Adi Shamir. [n.d.]. Quantitative Analysis of the Full Bitcoin Trans-
action Graph. In FC ’13: Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Finan-
cial Cryptography and Data Security (Okinawa, Japan, 2013-04). 6–24.
[46] Stefanie Roos, PedroMoreno-Sanchez, Aniket Kate, and Ian Goldberg. [n.d.]. Set-
tling Payments Fast and Private: Efficient Decentralized Routing for Path-Based
Transactions.
Timing Aacks on Privacy in Payment Channel Networks
0.6%
1.0%
1.3%
1.8%
4.7%
41.4%
49.1%
AF
CN
SA
OC
AS
NA
EU
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Share
R
eg
io
n
Figure 6: Geographical peer distribution of the Lightning
Network
0
500
1000
AF AS CN EU NA OC SA
Peer Region
A
v
g
.R
T
T
(m
s)
Figure 7: Latency distribution of Lightning’s peer-to-peer
network
[47] IstvánAndrás Seres, László Gulyás, Dániel A. Nagy, and Péter Burcsi. 2019. Topo-
logical Analysis of Bitcoin’s Lightning Network. CoRR abs/1901.04972 (2019).
arXiv:1901.04972
[48] Weizhao Tang, Weina Wang, Giulia C. Fanti, and Sewoong Oh. 2019. Privacy-
Utility Tradeoffs in Routing Cryptocurrency over Payment Channel Networks.
CoRR abs/1909.02717 (2019). arXiv:1909.02717
[49] Sergei Tikhomirov, Pedro Moreno-Sanchez, and Matteo Maffei. [n.d.]. A Quan-
titative Analysis of Security, Anonymity and Scalability for the Lightning Net-
work. ([n. d.]).
[50] Saar Tochner, Stefan Schmid, and Aviv Zohar. 2019. Hijacking Routes in Pay-
ment Channel Networks: A Predictability Tradeoff. CoRR abs/1909.06890 (2019).
arXiv:1909.06890
[51] Florian Tramèr, Dan Boneh, and Kenneth G. Paterson. 2020. Remote Side-
Channel Attacks on Anonymous Transactions. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
2020 (2020), 220.
[52] Gijs van Dam, Rabiah Abdul Kadir, Puteri N. E. Nohuddin, and Halimah Badioze
Zaman. 2019. Improvements of the Balance Discovery Attack on Lightning Net-
work Payment Channels. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive 2019 (2019), 1385.
[53] Shaileshh Bojja Venkatakrishnan, Giulia C. Fanti, and Pramod Viswanath. [n.d.].
Dandelion: Redesigning the Bitcoin Network for Anonymity. ([n. d.]).
A LIGHTNING’S PEER-TO-PEER NETWORK
In order to acquire a reliable model for inter-peer connections, we
in the following examine Lightning’s public peer-to-peer network.
To this end, we acquired a snapshot5 of the network graph taken
on March 26, 2020 00:00 UTC, extracted the 2679 public IPv4 ad-
dresses, and categorized them in regional clusters based on Ge-
oLite2 [32] geographic location database. As shown in Figure 6,
the peer-to-peer network spans seven regions of the globe: Europe
(EU), North America (NA), Asia (AS), Oceania (OC), South Amer-
ica (SA), China (CN), and Africa (AF). The data however also shows
that the network is currently clearly dominated by the EU and NA
regional clusters, which is in accordance with the regional distri-
bution of Bitcoin’s peer-to-peer network [7].
Based on this data, we setup a measurement study to infer a
suitable latency model for Lightning’s peer-to-peer network. For
this, we deployed seven measurement nodes as close as possible to
the aforementioned regional clusters, i.e., in the following Amazon
AWS regions: us-west-1 (NA), sa-east-1 (SA), eu-central-1
(EU), ap-southeast-2 (OC), ap-south-1 (AS), me-south-1 (AF),
and ap-east-1 (CN). After initialization, each measurement node
starts collecting ICMP ping results to each of the public Lightning
IP addresses. In particular, eachmeasurement would send 100 ping
requests to each Lightning node for 100 times, which allows to
build a more reliable round-trip time (RTT) model by averaging
over the results. Of the 2679 addresses, we found 1297 peers to be
offline or not reachable via ICMP, which corresponds to around
48% of the network. The regional latency distribution for the re-
maining peers is shown in Figure 7: while there are some regional
differences and outliers, the inter-peer latencies almost all fall be-
low the 500ms mark, with the global median being located around
250ms.
5https://gitlab.tu-berlin.de/rohrer/discharged-pc-data/blob/master/snapshots/lngraph_2020_03_26__00_00.json.zst
